Threat model¶
What a genuine verdict proves¶
- Integrity: the PDF bytes are exactly the bytes that were sealed.
- Origin of the seal: the seal was made by the holder of the private key whose public key is in the proof; with pinning, that this is the issuer's key.
- Time: the digest existed no later than the timestamp authority's
genTime(timestamp: trusted), and the issuer recorded it at the stated position in its ledger (ledger: consistent, recomputed locally).
What it does not prove¶
- Who signed the underlying document, that they were who they claimed, or that they had authority. The seal is the issuer's statement about bytes and time, not about the people in the document.
- The legal effect of the document in any jurisdiction.
- That the issuer's private key was never compromised: a stolen key makes valid seals. The issuer rotates keys and publishes fingerprints; keep the trust list current.
- Global consistency of the ledger: the local check recomputes one entry (or one segment). The online check compares against the issuer's published chain.
- That the timestamp authority's key was not revoked. Offline verification
consults no CRL or OCSP: a TSA signer revoked after
genTime(or a leaked key used with a back-datedgenTimeinside the certificate's validity) still yieldstimestamp: trusted. The shipped roots belong to authorities whose compromise would be public news; keep the package current.
Attacks considered¶
| Attack | Defence |
|---|---|
| Modified PDF with the original proof | hash mismatch, signature invalid, timestamp invalid |
| Forged proof with a new key | key rejected when pinned; unpinned is reported honestly when not |
| Replayed proof on a different PDF | hash mismatch |
| Back-dated timestamp | the token is signed by a TSA; forging it needs the TSA's key |
| Timestamp from a rogue TSA | chain must reach a shipped or user-supplied root; otherwise invalid |
| Malformed DER to confuse the parser | strict DER (minimal lengths/integers, no trailing bytes), fail closed |
| Timing side channels on digest compare | constant-time comparison |
| Tool phoning home | no network code; browser page is one file with no external requests |
| Supply chain of roots | roots downloaded from the CAs' own sites, committed, their SHA-256 pinned in tests |
| Crafted proof text aimed at the reader | CLI strips control characters; the page links verifyUrl only when it is https |
| Decompression bomb in an evidence ZIP | only the paths the verifier reads are inflated: 256 MiB per entry, 1 GiB and 1 000 entries in total |
| Operator misconfiguration | bad fingerprints / roots throw; they are never reported as "altered" |
| Weak hash on the token's own signature | CMS digest must be SHA-2 and the signature RSA or ECDSA; SHA-1 is refused outright |
| Evidence trimmed to hide a chain entry | a document the segment does not mention makes the archive incomplete |
| Stale verdict painted in the page | a run that finishes after a newer one started is discarded |